This book is divisible into roughly two parts:The first part lays out a new model for discussing and qualitatively understanding cyberwar and cyberwarefare。 The author talks at length about how cyberwar is likely impossible， since it is mostly a domain of warfare itself and unlikely to lead to an enemy’s capitulation。 However， the author lays out what delineates cyber warfare from intelligence operations， and roughly aligns his models with DoD’s Cyber Threat Framework。The second part is a capabi This book is divisible into roughly two parts:The first part lays out a new model for discussing and qualitatively understanding cyberwar and cyberwarefare。 The author talks at length about how cyberwar is likely impossible， since it is mostly a domain of warfare itself and unlikely to lead to an enemy’s capitulation。 However， the author lays out what delineates cyber warfare from intelligence operations， and roughly aligns his models with DoD’s Cyber Threat Framework。The second part is a capabilities discussion of major players in the cyber domain， and how they align their doctrine with their orders of battle。 The author profiles US， Russian， Chinese， and Iranian threat actors， and discusses their doctrines and ideologies vis-a-vis their efficacy and tactics in the cyber （and larger information） domain。I think the author’s models are interesting， if a little hair splitting， and I wish I had seen more on promotion of presence based operations to event based operations; what is an 0day today is tomorrow’s old day after all。 Also， the author switches from calling the tactical operation “an event operation” to an “event based attack” mid way thru。 Having said that， the author’s model for warfare determination is fascinating to me， and I’d love to see that in my Threat Intel tools， even if it’s only of utility to certain players。 All told， very interesting discussion of cyber （and by extension， intangible warfare）， even if I didn’t agree with all of it and wished it had some more depth in places 。。。more